乌克兰的Uber风格的“炮兵GIS艺术”软件包的战斗风格

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乌克兰的Uber风格的“炮兵GIS艺术”软件包的战斗风格

帖子 Mia2014 » 周一 5月 09, 2022 11:29 pm

简单总结如下:

以往的炮兵布阵往往是集中在一个地方(见图),乌克兰这次用的是租车软件类似的软件包,就是坦克等重型装备是分散部署的,哪个装备离目标近,就调用哪一个。而且,可以调集分散在各个地方的装备多次大范围的集中打击某个目标,而且,对方的对付炮兵连的装备用不上,因为炮弹来自不同的地方,而且,每个炮发来的炮弹数量少。

另外,是马斯克的星链,基本不需要原来地面上有基础建设,又点对点加密,很难拦截。

原作者:Trent Telenko https://twitter.com/TrentTelenko,我利用google翻译了一下,全文如下:

这将是一个关于乌克兰独特的 21 世纪基于 Uber 风格 C3I 软件的战斗风格的长线,为什么西方情报由于 CROWDSTRIKE 网络安全公司而对它一无所知,以及 SpaceX 的 Starlink 卫星通信对未来战争和政治的影响。这将是一个狂野的线程,所以系好安全带。

首先我们需要谈谈Yaroslav Sherstyuk编写的乌克兰“炮兵GIS艺术”软件包。

Sherstyuk 的软件包让人想起 Uber 或 Lyft 的出租车软件,它将目标分配给最近的枪支、迫击炮、火箭发射器、Aerosvidzka 无人机或特种部队团队。

这与美国军方的战术火力指挥系统 (TACFIRE) 或先进野战炮兵战术数据系统 (AFATDS) 完全不同。

2009 AFATDS 从运行 Linux 内核的 Sun Microsystems SPARC 计算机过渡到基于运行 Microsoft Windows 操作系统的笔记本电脑的版本。

炮兵的 GIS 艺术,或简称为“GIS 艺术”,不是移植到笔记本电脑的 1950 年的“星”式大型机终端 (TACFIRE) 或大型机-小型计算机终端 (AFTADS)。

这是一个真正的分布式软件环境,将触发请求到扣动扳机的时间从 20 分钟减少到 30 秒。

相比之下,美国陆军在二战中的触发时间为 5 分钟,在越南为 15 分钟,目前为 1 小时。

不,这不是错字。

美国陆军“从呼叫到扳机拉动”的时间增加,是为了必须努力防止向友军开火,并在师炮兵火控中心纳入 JAG 军官,以执行交战规则/对火力呼叫的附带损害审查。

2006 年,当美国陆军特种部队特遣部队狩猎高价值目标被允许直接使用带有 GMLRS 火箭的 MLRS 炮兵连时——没有 JAG 军官中毒指挥链——在伊拉克将其恢复到越南 15 分钟的水平,这要归功于蓝色力量追踪器。

奥巴马政府的这种情况并没有持续多久,这要归功于塔利班的高价值目标使用他们自己的孩子作为人体盾牌,然后是死去孩子的手机照片。

然后一切都回到了 JAG 军官游戏,特种部队开始购买游荡无人机。

回到“GIS Arta”应用程序,(GIS 意思是地理空间)它已经演变成一个多配置文件的指挥和控制系统,可以处理来自无人机、智能手机、测距仪和商业卫星图像的数据。

这有很多含义。

最大的是,通过良好的 SATCOM 链接,乌克兰高级指挥部可以将“GIS Arta”应用程序中的目标指定给整个乌克兰战场上最近的火力支援、无人机或车队猎人杀手团队,而无需向当地部队提供情报来源和方法.

由于 CROWDSTRIKE 网络安全公司 2016 年 12 月 22 日的一篇文章声称俄罗斯人入侵了“GIS Arta”,西方情报要么无知要么打折“GIS Arta”应用程序。

并且“花式熊”组使用相同的黑客方法进入 DNC。

问题是 CROWDSTRIKE 声称从未发生过黑客攻击“GIS Arta”应用程序。

美国之音在这里进行了笔录。

我知道 CrowdStrike 的联合创始人 Dimiti Alperovitc 当时在撒谎,因为我在 2015 年夏天对我对顿巴斯 DNR 部队的奇怪乌克兰炮兵集中进行了一次 OSINT 调查。

乌克兰军队似乎在使用老式苏联时代的地面监视雷达来引导其纵深火炮打击。

顿巴斯战争列表管理员发送的俄罗斯视频显示,乌克兰军队的炮击错过了一个俄罗斯车队,这是一个老式雷达的经典质心错误,该雷达有两个目标在极端范围内靠得很近,并将它们视为一个目标。

视频显示右侧有一支大型车队,左侧有乌克兰军队的炮击。

[注:信息图显示箔条将“雷达质心”从喷气机上拉下]

视频随后稍微平移,并显示第二条道路向左行驶,上面有车队。

两条道路似乎都在接近摄像机视野之外的岔路口。

我向列表管理员询问了这件事,特别是 ARK-1 RICE BAG 雷达是否可以实现这一目标。

有人告诉我“不,最有可能指挥炮火的乌克兰传感器是 Su-24MR FENCER E M-101 Shtik 侧视空中雷达 (SLAR)”

我所描述的雷达质心误差是 1985 年苏联时代套件的正确位置。

Su-24MR FENCER E 具有远程空对地数据链路,但用它指挥火炮暗示了一些明显非苏联时代的指挥和控制原则。

还有一个事实是大范围的集中炮击看起来不对。 看起来不对,我的意思是它全部降落在一个地方,爆炸表明炮弹来自完全不同的方位角。

这有点像,有点像许多单炮的预定攻击目标时间(TOT)。

通常,俄罗斯的学说炮兵连发射“炮兵连解决方案”,大范围的集中炮击以火炮的地面编队模式降落。

来自几个俄罗斯炮台的预定攻击目标时间将覆盖相当大的区域。

所以乌克兰人正在做别的事情。

我系统地搜索了乌克兰军队的顿巴斯炮兵的炮击视频和乌克兰炮兵阵地(单炮)的照片。

最引人注目的是大范围的集中炮击的时机、紧密度和炮弹爆炸的可变性。

乌克兰军队的火炮不是作为炮兵连发射的。他们作为单独的火炮和发射器射击,然后立即转移。

分散在大范围内的多门不同口径的单门火炮和迫击炮以预定攻击目标时间方式射击。

鉴于以下情况:

1. 配备有 GPS 单元的前向观测器的雷达或激光测距仪,

2. 带有数字无线电、数字火炮火控计算机和 GPS 单元的火炮,以及

3. 将它们联系在一起的数字互联网数据链路无线电通信。

然后,从射程内的任何枪支对目标进行多炮、多弹药口径的编程就变得相对容易。您甚至可以在短时间内,每次使用不同的火炮,对同一目标实施预定攻击目标时间方式的,多次大范围的集中炮击。

这意味着俄罗斯的反炮兵连雷达没有看到炮兵连射击。

他们看到前线有许多单独的火炮,有多个弹道,每个在整个前线向相同或不同的目标射击不到三发炮弹。

这就是为什么俄罗斯人在 2015 年夏天之后没有用反炮击杀大量乌克兰军队的拖曳火炮的原因。

俄罗斯的反炮兵连雷达没有看到用于 MLRS 射击的“有价值的”炮兵连大小的目标。

当它出现时,它还使俄罗斯空中力量在反炮兵连作用中的效率大大降低。

让乌克兰付出代价的,不是拖曳 122 毫米火炮被反炮兵连破坏。当 Debaltsevo 口袋掉下来时,这就是放弃。
https://radiosvoboda.org/a/27555492.html

乌克兰人在每门 122 毫米拖曳炮上挖了多个阵地。他们没有资源对他们的卡车原动机做同样的事情。

他们可以伪装它们,但不能让它们进入掩体。

随着时间的推移,碎片损坏的绝对重量使他们无法在 Debaltsevo 撤离之日进行修复。

乌克兰军队选择拯救其部队而不是重型武器,并在短时间内尽可能地禁用重型武器。

今天向乌克兰人开火的许多 DNR 和 LNR 122 毫米炮都来自德巴尔采沃口袋的陷落。

告诉我 CROWDSTRIKE 的另一件事是在入侵后的头几天撒谎。

俄罗斯以“零日漏洞利用”开战,其目标就像一把匕首,瞄准了 GIS Art for Artillery 应用程序。

俄罗斯拆除了乌克兰所有的卫星通信终端,此外还有不少欧洲的卫星通信终端。

这时马斯克SpaceX Starlink 星座进来了。

乌克兰转向马斯克,用 Starlink 替换“炮兵的 GIS 艺术”的战前 SATCOM 链接。

迄今为止,不仅那些 SATCOM 被替换,SpaceX 还给 DoD 和西方三信情报机构留下了深刻的印象。

SpaceX 轻松击败了俄罗斯联邦可以发动的最强大的网络和干扰攻击。

此外,SpaceX 的 Starlink 互联网服务鲜为人知的功能之一是为 Starlink 用户加密且不使用任何地面基础设施的点对点电子邮件服务,它已帮助俄罗斯后方的乌克兰军事单位以最少的电子签名进行通信,以进行俄罗斯测向利用。

实际上,Starlink 为乌克兰提供了美国的军事太空电信带宽,战前对卫星基础设施的投资为零。

乌克兰的“炮兵 GIS 艺术”应用程序与 Starlink 相结合,实际上为乌克兰军队提供了比美国军方标准的炮兵指挥和控制更好的能力。

乌克兰战争是第一次星链战争,有星链的一方正在击败没有星链的一方。

这种想法有很多含义。

现在来了踢球者。当lasercom 配备SpaceX Gen 1.5 和2.0 卫星上线时。

使用零地面基础设施移动大量带宽的能力将彻底颠覆国家政府和公司阻止或监视 Starlink 通信的能力。


美国政府能够监控 Starlink 通信的唯一方法是马斯克积极合作。

这一事实所涉及的权力转移是......深刻......以及另一个线程的东西

与此同时,随着星链主宰通过帮助乌克兰赢得“第一次星链战争”来重塑世界,许多非常有权势的人将不得不重新考虑他们在世界上的位置。
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上次由 Mia2014 在 周一 5月 09, 2022 11:57 pm,总共编辑 5 次。

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乌克兰的Uber风格的“炮兵GIS艺术”软件包的战斗风格(英文)

帖子 Mia2014 » 周一 5月 09, 2022 11:31 pm

Author:https://twitter.com/TrentTelenko

This is going to be a long thread on Ukraine's unique 21st century fighting style based on Uber style C3I software, why Western intelligence is plug ignorant of it due to CROWDSTRIKE cybersecurity firm, & the implications of SpaceX's Starlink satcom for the future of warfare & politics. This is going to be a wild thread, so buckle up.

First we need to talk about Ukraine's "GIS Art for Artillery" software package written by Yaroslav Sherstyuk.

Sherstyuk's software package is reminiscent Uber or Lyft's taxi software in that assigns targets to the nearest gun, mortar, rocket launcher, Aerosvidzka drone or SF team.

This is nothing like the US Military's Tactical Fire Direction System (TACFIRE) or Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS).

The 2009 AFATDS transitioned from a Sun Microsystems SPARC computer running the Linux kernel to a version based on laptop computers running the Microsoft Windows operating system.

GIS Art for Artillery, or "GIS Art" for short, isn't the 1950's "Star" style Mainframe-terminal (TACFIRE) or Mainframe-Minicomputer-terminal (AFTADS) ported over to laptops.

It is a true distributed software environment that reduced request for fire to trigger pull from 20 minutes to 30 seconds.

By comparison, the US Army did that call to trigger pull in 5 minutes in WW2, 15 minutes in Vietnam and one hour currently.

No, that isn't a typo.

The increased US Army time 'from call to trigger pull' has to do trying to prevent friendly fire plus the inclusion of JAG officers in Division artillery fire control centers doing rules of engagement/collateral damage vetting of calls for fire.

In 2006, when US Army Special Forces task force hunting high value targets was given direct access to an MLRS battery with GMLRS rockets - without a JAG officer poisoned chain of command - got it back down to Vietnam 15-minute levels in Iraq, thanks to the Blue Force Tracker.

This didn't last long with the Obama Administration thanks to Taliban high value targets using their own kids as human shields followed by cellphone photos of dead kids.

Then everything went back to the JAG officer game & the Special Forces started buying loitering drones.

Returning to the "GIS Arta" app, (GIS meaning geospatial) it has evolved into a multi-profile command and control system that can process data from drones, smartphones, rangefinders and commercial satellite images.

This has a lot of implications.

The biggest being that with a good SATCOM link Ukrainian high command could nominate targets in the the "GIS Arta" app to the nearest fire support, drone or convoy hunter killer teams throughout the entire Ukrainian battle space without tipping local units to intelligence sources & methods.

Western Intelligence is either ignorant or discounts the "GIS Arta" app because of a CROWDSTRIKE cybersecurity firm December 22, 2016 article claiming the Russians hacked "GIS Arta."

And that the "Fancy Bear" group used the same hacking method to to get into the DNC.

The problem is that hacking of the "GIS Arta" app CROWDSTRIKE claimed never happened.

The VOA did a takedown here:

I knew that CrowdStrike co-founder Dimiti Alperovitc was lying at the time because of a summer 2015 OSINT investigation I did of the strange Ukrainian artillery concentrations hitting DNR forces in Donbas.

The Ukrainian Army seemed to be using older Soviet-era ground surveillance radars to guide its deep artillery strikes.

Russian video's sent by the Donbas War list-admin showed a UA artillery strike missing a Russian convoy in a classic centroid error of an older radar that has two targets close together at extreme range and sees them as a single target.

The video showed a large convoy on the right and UA artillery strikes to the left of them.

[Note: The infographic shows chaff pulling a 'radar centroid' off of a jet]

The video then pans a little and shows a second road further left with a convoy of vehicles on it.

Both roads seemed to be approaching a fork out of camera view.

I asked the list-admin about it & specifically if a ARK-1 RICE BAG radar could pull that off.

I was told 'No, the most likely Ukrainian sensor directing the artillery fire was a Su-24MR FENCER E M-101 Shtik side looking aerial radar (SLAR)'

The radar centroid error I described was spot-on for 1985 Soviet era kit.

The Su-24MR FENCER E had long range air to ground data links, but directing artillery with it implied some distinctly non-Soviet era command and control doctrine.

There was also the fact the barrage looked wrong. And by looked wrong I mean it was all landing in one spot with explosions indicating shells from radically different azimuths.

It was kinda, sorta, a time on target (TOT) from lots of individual guns.

Usually Russian doctrine artillery batteries fire a "battery solution" and the barrage lands in the pattern of the ground formation of the firing guns.

A TOT from several Russian gun batteries would cover a significant area.

So the Ukrainians were doing something else.

I systematically searched through Donbas artillery videos of UA artillery strikes & photos of UA artillery positions (single guns).

The thing that stood out was the timing of the barrages, the tightness of the barrages and the variability of the shell bursts.

UA artillery were not firing as batteries. They were firing as individual guns and launchers, then displacing immediately.

Multiple individual guns & mortars of different calibers were shooting dispersed across a large area at the same target in the TOT manner.

Given the following:

1. A radar or laser range finder equipped forward observer with a GPS unit,

2. A gun with a digital radio, digital artillery fire control computer and a GPS unit, and

3. A digital internet data link radio communications tying them together.

It then becomes relatively easy to program a multi-gun, multi-ammunition caliber time on target from whatever guns are in range. You can even call down multiple TOT barrages in a short amount of time using different guns for each barrage-strike on the same target.

That meant Russian counter-battery radars were not seeing battery shoots.

They were seeing lots of individual guns across the front, with multiple trajectories, shooting less than three shells, at the same or different targets, across a whole front.

That was why the Russians were not killing a lot of UA towed artillery with counter-battery in the Summer of 2015 onward.

Russian counter-battery radars were not seeing "worthwhile" battery sized targets for MLRS shoots.

It also made Russian airpower much less effective in the counterbattery role when it showed up.

What cost Ukraine it's towed 122mm guns wasn't destruction by counter battery. It was abandonment when the Debaltsevo pocket fell.

https://radiosvoboda.org/a/27555492.html

The Ukrainians had multiple dug in positions per 122mm towed gun. They didn't have the resources to do the same with their truck prime movers.

They could camouflage them, but not get them into cover.

The sheer weight of fragmentation damage over time disabled them beyond the local ability to repair the day the Debaltsevo pull out came.

The Ukrainian Army chose to save its troops over its heavy weapons and disabled heavy weapons as best they could at short notice.

A lot of DNR & LNR 122mm guns firing at Ukrainians today came from the fall of the Debaltsevo pocket.

The other thing that informed me CROWDSTRIKE was lying happened in the first couple of days post-invasion.

Russia opened the war with a "Zero-day exploit"aimed like a dagger at GIS Art for Artillery app.

Russia took down all of Ukraine's SATCOM terminals and quite a few in Europe besides.

This is where
@elonmusk
SpaceX Starlink constellation comes in.

Ukraine turned to
@elonmusk
to replace it's pre-war SATCOM links for 'GIS Art for Artillery' with Starlink.

To date, not only have those SATCOM been replaced, SpaceX has impressed the DoD and Western three letter intelligence agencies generally.

SpaceX has handily defeated the strongest cyber & jamming attacks the Russian Federation can assemble.

In addition, one of the lesser known features of SpaceX's Starlink internet service, point to point email service for Starlink users encrypted and not using any ground infrastructure whatsoever, has aided Ukrainian military units behind Russian lines to communicate

...with minimal electronic signature for Russian direction finding to exploit.

Effectively Starlink gave Ukraine the military space telecommunications bandwidth of the United States with zero investment in satellite infrastructure before the war.

Ukraine's 'GIS Art for Artillery' app combined with Starlink actually gives the Ukrainian military measurably better than US Military standard artillery command and control.

The Ukraine War is the first Starlink War & the side with Starlink is beating the side without.

There are a lot of implications in that thought.

Now comes the kicker. When the lasercom equipped SpaceX Gen 1.5 & 2.0 satellites come on-line.

The ability to move huge amounts of bandwidth with zero ground based infrastructure will utterly subvert the ability of national governments & corporations to block or surveil Starlink communications.


The only way the US Government will be able to monitor Starlink communications is with
@elonmusk
active cooperation.

The power shift involved in that fact is...profound...and something for another thread

Meanwhile, a whole lot of very powerful people are going to have to rethink their place in the world as the Starlink juggernaut remakes the world by helping Ukraine win "The 1st Starlink War."

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